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Abstract
We use laboratory experiments to test for one of the foundations of the rational voter
paradigm – that voters respond to probabilities of being pivotal. We exploit a setup
that entails stark theoretical effects of information concerning the preference distribution
(as revealed through polls) on costly participation decisions. The data reveal several
insights. First, voting propensity increases systematically with subjects’ predictions of
their preferred alternative’s advantage. Consequently, pre-election polls do not exhibit
the detrimental welfare effects that extant theoretical work predicts. They lead to more
participation by the expected majority and generate more landslide elections. Finally,
we investigate subjects’ behavior in polls and identify when Bandwagon and Underdog
Effects arise.
JEL classification numbers: C92, D02, D72
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1 Introduction
1.1 Overview
At the core of the pivotal voter model is the idea that voters respond to the likelihood
that their vote will matter for the collective decision, i.e., that they will be pivotal.
This canonical model has many important implications. If participation is at all costly
(be it due to travel costs involved in getting to the booth for political voters, time
costs for faculty invited to a recruiting meeting, etc.), greater turnout is to be expected
when the likelihood of a close decision is higher. Furthermore, information regarding
the distribution of preferences, such as the fraction of the population that supports one
alternative relative to another, would induce those in the minority to participate at
greater rates. Consequently, any such information, which is commonly dispelled through
polls, would have detrimental welfare effects. It would induce more costly participation
and make the majority-preferred alternative less likely to be selected.
Large political elections provide a rather challenging case for the underlying premise of
the pivotal voter model. Indeed, probabilities of pivotality are perceived to be pervasively
low – for example, Mulligan and Hunter (2003) estimate that approximately one of every
100,000 votes cast in U.S. Congressional elections, and one of every 15,000 votes cast in
state legislator elections, ‘mattered’ in that they were cast for a candidate that tied or
won the election by precisely one vote. Nonetheless, the value of participation in political
elections is hard to assess, and the pivotal voter model could still provide useful guidance
in terms of the effects of information on outcomes, the behavior of individuals in small
groups making collective decisions in which pivot probabilities are substantial, etc.
∗We thank Guillaume Frechette and Tom Palfrey for useful suggestions. We gratefully ac-
knowledge financial support from the European Research Council (ERC Advanced Investigator
Grant, ESEI-249433), the National Science Foundation (SES 0963583), and the Henry and
Betty Moore Foundation.
Previous experimental work has suggested that higher probabilities of pivotality in-
deed induce greater participation rates (see literature review below for an elaborate dis-
cussion), in support of the pivotal voter model. Nonetheless, elections that are not close
can be of two sorts from the perspective of a voter. They can correspond to the voter’s
preferred candidate either winning or losing by a large margin. The pivotal voter model
prescribes that, conditional on the election not being close, which of these two conse-
quences the voter believes in should not matter for the comparative statics regarding
participation – she should still participate less than when elections are predicted to be
close. One of the goals of the current paper is to unpack the two types of landslide
elections and re-examine the pivotal voter model. In addition, we study mechanisms by
which voters form beliefs regarding election outcomes, namely election polls.
Specifically, the paper describes an array of experiments that focus on the explicit
link between voters’ beliefs and their participation decisions. These are some of the first
experiments to elicit beliefs directly in a variety of informational settings.1 In particular,
we consider the impact of information revealed through polls and the welfare consequences
they entail. Our design consequently contributes to the understanding of how individuals
report their intentions in polls as well.
In detail, 22 groups of 9 subjects each participated in a total of 440 elections between
two alternatives. Subjects had to choose one of two colors: Red or Blue, using majority
rule. At the outset of each election, one of two jars was selected at random – a “red”
or a “blue” jar. The red jar contained two red balls and one blue ball and the blue jar
contained two blue balls and one red ball. Each of the nine subjects in a group received an
independent draw (with replacement) from the selected jar. The color of the drawn ball
represented the subject’s preferred alternative (and, therefore, the chosen jar captured
the distribution of preferences). Ultimately, each subject had to decide whether to cast
a costly vote for either Red or Blue, or whether to abstain.
We considered three treatments. In all treatments subjects knew their own preferred
color. In our baseline No Polls treatment, subjects were provided with no further in-
formation. In the Perfect Polls treatment, subjects were also informed of the selected
jar. In particular, subjects knew the alternative likely to be supported by a majority. In
the Lab Polls treatment, subjects participated in a poll reporting their voting intentions
and were told the results of that poll before deciding whether to cast a vote or abstain.
In all groups, subjects were asked to predict the group preference composition and ulti-
mate voting profile prior to voting, i.e. report their beliefs regarding the outcome of the
election.
While we use the terminology of political elections, thinking of subjects as voters, our
experimental setup can be thought off as a metaphor for a wide variety of settings, includ-
ing investment decisions by corporate strategy committees, hiring and tenure decisions
by university faculty, and so on.
1See the literature review below for exceptions.
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The experimental data reveal several interesting insights. First, the propensity to
vote increases systematically with experimental subjects’ predictions of their preferred
color’s advantage – the more likely they thought their preferred color was to win, the
more likely they were to vote. With regards to the pivotal voter model, turnout rates
are significantly higher for elections that are predicted to be close relative to all others
aggregated together. However, our design allows for a more refined look into the response
of turnout to beliefs. It reveals a monotonic pattern that is not in line with the pivotal
voter model – elections that are predicted to yield a victory to the preferred alternative
induce greater participation. In fact, a modification of the pivotal voter model a-la
Callander (2007) in which voters receive a benefit from voting for the winner of an
election explains a large fraction of our data.
Second, the information regarding the preference distribution in the population does
not have a detrimental effect on welfare as theory would predict. In fact, all of our
treatments yield comparable welfare levels. From a policy perspective, this suggests that
dispelling information in the electorate would not be as harmful as our standard theoret-
ical framework would suggest. Furthermore, while the pivotal voter model would imply
that polls, suggestive of which alternative is supported by a majority of the population,
would induce minority supporters to turn out more and therefore lead to closer elec-
tions, in our experiments landslide elections are significantly more common when more
information is available to the electorate.
Last, our design allows us to inspect the behavior of subjects in polls. In our exper-
imental polls, very few subjects misreport the alternative they will vote for. However,
there is substantial discrepancy between declared intentions to participate and ultimate
turnout decisions. Pre-election polls consistently overestimate voter turnout.2 In our ex-
periments, 82% of subjects reported that they will vote, while in fact no more than 50%
actually voted (and, of those reporting they will vote, only 42% ultimately participated).
The patterns of ultimate participation shed light on some of the empirical observations
regarding polls. Namely, the literature has been inconclusive on whether polls lead to
Bandwagon Effects, making poll winners win with even greater leads than predicted, or
Underdog Effects, leading poll winners to lose votes in the actual election. Our results il-
lustrate that which effect prevails depends on the margins of victory elicited by the polls.
When poll victories are small, Bandwagon Effects appear, while when polls predict a
landslide victory for one of the alternatives, Underdog Effects are observed.
1.2 Related Literature
The crux of the pivotal voter model is the observation that a vote matters only when
it is pivotal. When preferences are private, the pivotal voter model translates into a
simple cost-benefit analysis. A voter needs to contemplate the probability that her vote
2This phenomenon has been diagnosed in a variety of polling environments. For instance, the Amer-
ican National Election Study (ANES) is prone to exaggerated reported intentions to turn out (see
Holbrook and Krosnick, 2010 and references therein).
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determines the election (the benefit) and weigh it against the cost of participation. Sup-
pose two alternatives are being considered. In a model in which all voters experience the
same distribution of participation costs, as in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983) and Borgers
(2004), majority supporters will participate less than minority supporters, and overall
participation will decline with participation costs.3
Some of the theoretical predictions of the pivotal voter model have been observed
in the lab. Levine and Palfrey (2007) directly tested the Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983)
model and found confirmation for the main comparative statics predicted by the model.
For example, Levine and Palfrey document that participation declines with participation
costs. This result has also been documented by Cason and Mui (2005) and Kartal (2012)
in slightly different settings. Nonetheless, most experimental studies find that majority
supporters vote with greater propensities than minority ones (see Duffy and Tavits, 2008,
Großer and Schram, 2010, and Kartal, 2012), contrasting the predictions of the pivotal
voter model.4
When the distribution of preferences is commonly known, the most efficient outcome
(corresponding to the majority-preferred alternative when payoffs are symmetric) can
be deduced absent an election. The recent literature has therefore suggested that it is
uncertainty over preferences in the electorate that make elections an important collective
decision instrument. Goeree and Großer (2007) and Taylor and Yildrim (2010) consider
models in which there is uncertainty over who is the majority-preferred candidate. Ab-
sent any information, individuals cannot condition their participation on whether or not
they are majority supporters. Participation rates are therefore comparable across the
minority and majority camps and the majority-preferred candidate is likely to be chosen.
In such elections, polls may play an important role, as they provide information to voters
regarding their likelihood of belonging to the majority. Information regarding the distri-
bution of preferences may induce minority supporters to vote more since their likelihood
to affect election outcomes is higher. Therefore, polls may lead to more participation,
and lower likelihood of the majority-preferred candidate to be selected. Consequently,
polls have a negative welfare effect.5
Several papers have considered the impact of information on preferences in the lab.
Duffy and Tavits (2008) observe a positive association between predicted closeness of
an election and participation rates. Nonetheless, they do not observe subjects’ beliefs
regarding ultimate outcomes and therefore cannot distinguish between landslide elections
3When there is uncertainty over which alternative is superior, a strategic agent also considers the
information contained in the event of being pivotal, taking into account others’ strategies (see Austen-
Smith and Banks, 1996; Myerson, 1998; Feddersen and Pesendorfer, 1996, 1997, 1998).
4The only experimental paper reporting greater minority support is Levine and Palfrey (2007). How-
ever, the differences in observed participation rates in this setup are rather small: when the size of the
electorate is 9, majority supporters vote at a rate of 40% or 45%, while minority supporters vote at a
rate of 44% or 48%, depending on the relative volume of minority supporters.
5The effects of polls in information aggregation settings is analyzed in Coughlan (2000). The effects
of free-form communication preceding elections, with either private information or private preferences,
appears in Gerardi and Yariv (2007).
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that culminate in a victory or a loss for the preferred candidate.
Großer and Schram (2010) and Klor and Winter (2006) consider experimental polls
that reveal the precise distribution of preferences in the electorate (effectively mimicking
the Palfrey and Rosenthal, 1983, setting). They find that polls by and large increase
turnout and have welfare effects that depend on how equally divided support is. When
there are unequal levels of support, polls have non-negative welfare effects. However, in
closely divided electorates, polls have detrimental effects on welfare.6,7
As a summary, we note that the experiments described in this paper provide three
important methodological innovations. First, we elicit subjects’ beliefs regarding election
outcomes prior to their choices, information that is particularly challenging to gather from
field data. This allows us to test the pivotal voter model in a direct manner. Second, we
consider polls that take place in the lab and can therefore inspect behavior in the poll as
well as in response to its results.8 Last, all of our settings entail some uncertainty over
which alternative is favored by the majority, environments in which collective decision
protocols may be particularly important.
1.3 Paper Structure
Section 2 describes the experimental design. The corresponding theoretical predictions
are analyzed in Section 3. We present the experimental results in Sections 4-6 in the
following order. We start by inspecting individual voting behavior in elections and how
it responds to beliefs regarding the lead of the preferred alternative (Section 4). We then
move to inspecting the effects of the observed behavior on outcomes in Section 5. We
first look at the emergent lead of elections, and then study the effects of polls on both
leads and welfare. Finally, in Section 6 we analyze reports in the experimental polls and
their effects on ultimate outcomes. Section 7 concludes.
6Forsythe, Myerson, Rietz, and Weber (1993) consider polls in elections with complete information
involving more than two candidates. There is also an experimental literature considering different forms
of communication preceding elections in which participation is free, but individuals have private informa-
tion regarding the ‘quality’ of either of the two candidates; See Goeree and Yariv (2011), Guarnaschelli,
McKelvey, and Palfrey (2000), and references therein. Sinclair and Plott (2012) consider experimental
spatial elections in which candidates’ locations are uncertain and observe how polls allow subjects to
ultimately behave as if they are informed.
7For a general review of political economy experiments, see Palfrey (2006). There is also some
empirical work investigating the predictions of the pivotal voter model regarding turnout in small-scale
elections. Coate and Conlin (2004) and Coate, Conlin and Moro (2008) use data from the Texas liquor
referenda and illustrate the limited guidance the pivotal voter model provides in predicting outcomes.
8There exists a large empirical literature in Political Science that investigates how polls influence
voters’ behavior. One of the problematic aspects of most of the field studies on this topic is the necessity
to disentangle whether polls affect preferences, or change voters’ propensity to vote. Our experiments
provide a clean separation between these two channels, since voter preferences are fixed.
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2 Experimental Design
We use a sequence of experiments to assess voters’ response to information and beliefs
regarding the underlying distribution of preferences.9 There is a “red” jar and a “blue”
jar: the red jar contains two red balls and one blue ball and the blue jar contains two
blue balls and one red ball. We use the color of the jar as a metaphor for the inclination
of the decision-making group (a committee, an electorate) toward one of two alternatives
that are being considered (an investment opportunity, a political candidate). At the start
of each session, subjects are randomized into a group of nine subjects.10 The timing of
each of our sessions was as follows:
States and Preferences. At the start of each of 20 periods, one of the jars is chosen by a
toss of a fair coin. In each period, after the jar had been selected, each of the nine subjects
in a group receives an independent draw (with replacement) from the selected jar. The
color of the drawn ball matches the jar’s color with probability p = 2/3. Ultimately, each
group of subjects chooses an alternative – red or blue. The individual color each subject
draws corresponds to the subject’s preferred alternative.
Polls. Depending on the treatment, subjects were provided some information on the
realized jar. Specifically, we had three types of sessions:
No Polls Subjects know that each jar had a 50− 50 probability of being selected, but
observe no information on the realized jar other than their private draw.
Perfect Polls Subjects are perfectly informed of the realized jar in each period. This
corresponds to a situation in which agents’ preferences are polled perfectly so that
the distribution of preferences in the population is transparent to all.11
Lab Polls After private draws (i.e., preferences) for a period are revealed, subjects are
asked to declare their intended actions: abstain, vote for red, or vote for blue. The
resulting overall statistics (number of subjects intending to abstain, vote for red,
and vote for blue) are then reported to subjects. This treatment replicates real
polls in which subjects may potentially be strategic when responding to the polls
and not necessarily report their actual intended actions.
Beliefs. After receiving information regarding the realized jar as determined by one of
the three treatments, subjects are asked to report their beliefs regarding the composition
9The full instructions we used are available at: http://www.hss.caltech.edu/˜lyariv/Research.htm
10We kept subjects in the same group throughout each session in order to avoid potential ‘contam-
ination’ across groups and since repeated game effects seemed particularly difficult in this setting. In
fact, subjects did not seem to exhibit any group-dependent inter-temporal correlation in behavior (see
Section 4.3).
11For example, if the color of the realized jar was blue, then each subject knows that each member of
the group has a 2/3 chance of drawing a blue ball and a 1/3 chance of drawing a red ball.
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of the group (number of subjects preferring red and number of subjects preferring blue),
as well as the distribution of votes (for red and blue).12 At the end of the experiment,
one of these guesses was randomly chosen for each subject and the subject was paid a
$10 bonus for that guess being correct.
Decisions and Payoffs. After subjects report their beliefs, each decides whether to
abstain, vote red, or vote blue. Voting (for either red or blue) entails a cost of either 25
cents or 50 cents.13 Once all decisions are received, each group’s votes are tallied and
the alternative receiving the majority of votes is selected (ties broken randomly). Each
subject for whom the color of the private draw coincides with the selected alternative
receives $2 for that period, while others receive no additional payments. The resulting
per-period payoff is a reward corresponding to the selected alternative ($0 or $2) minus
any cost incurred by voting.
To summarize, the experiments employ a 3 × 2 design based on variations in the
information available to voters regarding the underlying distribution of preferences and
the voting participation costs. Each experimental session implemented one of the in-
formation treatments (No Polls, Perfect Polls, or Lab Polls). Within most sessions, the
initial 10 periods have costs set at 50 cents and are followed by 10 periods in which par-
ticipation costs are set at 25 cents.14 In order to check for order effects, we ran several
sessions in each information treatment with the order of costs reversed (namely, in two
groups corresponding to the No Polls treatment and in three groups corresponding to
each of the Perfect Polls and Lab Polls treatments). These “reverse order” sessions led to
qualitatively identical insights as our baseline treatments. In order to keep the discussion
focused, we report results aggregated across all sessions.15
The experiments were conducted at the California Social Sciences Experimental Lab-
oratory (CASSEL) at UCLA. Overall, 198 subjects participated. The average payoff per
subject in the No Polls treatment was $29.4, the average payoff per subject in the Perfect
Polls treatment was $31.9, while the corresponding average in the Lab Polls treatment
was $30.1.16 In addition, each subject received a $5 show-up fee. Table 1 summarizes
the details of our design.
12Subjects’ guesses regarding group composition had to specify two numbers summing up to 9. Their
guesses regarding the vote distribution did not have to comply with that restriction, due to the possibility
of some subjects ultimately abstaining.
13These costs were common and known to all subjects in the beginning of the round.
14Notice that the size of the bonus is sufficiently small as to make group behavior aimed at achieving
the bonus particularly costly. In fact, while subjects had an accurate general perception of outcomes,
their rates of correct guesses were very low, always lower than 10%. We return to this point in Section
4.3.
15Separate analysis of the sessions in which rounds with voting costs of 25 cents preceded the rounds
with voting costs of 50 cents is available from the authors upon request.
16These numbers correspond to the sum of the 20 period payoffs and the potential $10 bonus payment
for reporting a correct belief in the (randomly) chosen period and question.
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!
Number!of Probablity!of!
Subjects Belonging!to!Majority
No!Polls 63 7 9 No No 2/3 $2
Perfect!Polls 72 8 9 Yes No. 2/3 $2
Lab!Polls 63 7 9 No Yes 2/3 $2
Table!1:!Experimental!Design
Maximal!
Prize
Groups
Group!
Size
Known!
Jar
Polls!
Run
Table 1: Experimental Design
Discussion of the Experimental Design
There are several innovations our experimental design introduces relative to existing
experimental work on participation. First, we elicit beliefs directly. Second, we allow
for pre-election polls (importantly, ones whose role is not solely to ease coordination).
Third, in all our environments there is some uncertainty, even when some form of polls
is introduced.
There are some important design choices that are worth discussing. Our belief elici-
tation procedure entails subjects predicting the lead of the preferred candidate and the
number of individuals of each preference type. This technique is different than that
involving quadratic scoring rules for incentivizing truthful reports, which is commonly
utilized in the experimental literature (see Gneiting and Raftery, 2007 for a review of
proper incentives for belief elicitation). It is important to note that quadratic scoring
rules require subjects to report a vector of beliefs over a set of plausible events. They
are therefore practical when the set of plausible events is not too large. In our setting,
the number of possible leads of the preferred candidate is a number between 0 and 9.
The number of possible outcomes, comprised of the number of participants and the dis-
tribution of votes, is far larger.17 The main advantage of our method is that it is simple.
Furthermore, it is not sensitive to risk aversion as are quadratic scoring rules.18
Another design choice pertains to the discreteness of costs. While having a few
discrete cost levels is in line with much of the experimental literature, an alternative
design would have costs as a continuous parameter. A subject would then effectively
need to decide on a threshold cost below which participation would be selected (much as
in Levine and Palfrey, 2007). While this would be a very reasonable alternative design,
we chose the discrete cost settings since it allows subjects to learn about the game itself
more quickly – indeed, when costs are continuously determined, the likelihood of facing
two similar costs in any two periods is low and many periods need to be run in order for
subjects to get experience with the game itself. In fact, as we will see (in Section 4.3),
there was rather limited learning in all of our sessions.
17For any number k of participants, there are k+ 1 possible leads of one candidate over the other, and
so the overall number of outcomes is given by 1 + 2 + ... + 10 = 55.
18If subjects report expected leads, this elicitation process allows us to deduce the probability of
pivotality from the reports of both lead and preference distribution (see Section 4.2).
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3 Theoretical Predictions
Our experimental design is in line with the model proposed by Goeree and Großer (2007).
Formally, consider a group of n ≥ 2 individuals (subjects, committee members, political
voters, etc.) who collectively choose one of two alternatives, {red, blue}. This can be
understood as a metaphor for a choice between two political candidates, investment
alternatives, etc. Each individual experiences a cost c > 0 if she participates and 0
otherwise. The chosen alternative is determined using simple majority rule among the
votes cast by all individuals who participated, where a tie leads to a random draw of one
of the alternatives. An individual’s utility is V if her preferred alternative wins and 0
otherwise.
At the outset, a state of nature is chosen randomly from {R,B} (experimentally
corresponding to a red or blue jar; metaphorically, to a state in which one candidate is
more popular than another). Both states are a-priori equally likely. If the state is R, each
individual receives an r ‘badge’ with probability p ≥ 1/2 and a b badge with probability
1− p. Similarly, when the state is B, each individual receives a b badge with probability
p and an r badge with probability 1− p. An individual receiving an r badge prefers the
alternative red (and receives no utility from the alternative blue being selected), while
an individual with a b badge prefers the state blue.
The main parameter for this study is how much agents know about the selected state:
without polls, only the prior; with perfect polls, the realized state; with lab polls, a noisy
statistic about the realized state.
3.1 No Access to Polls
When agents are uninformed of the realized state, all are ex-ante symmetric. We focus
on symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria. Since c > 0 and there are only two alternatives,
whenever agents participate, they vote for their most preferred candidate.
Denote by Ppiv(k) the probability that an agent is pivotal when k other agents par-
ticipate. If no other agent participates, an individual is certainly pivotal: Ppiv(0) = 1.
When one other agent participates, the individual is pivotal only when the other agent
has opposing preferences, Ppiv(1) = 1/2. For any j = 1, ..., b(n− 1) /2c ,19
Ppiv(2j) =
(
2j
j
)
pj(1− p)j and Ppiv(2j + 1) =
(
2j + 2
j + 1
)
pj+1(1− p)j+1.
Notice that an agent is pivotal either when a vote by her would create a tie (avoiding
her preferred alternative being defeated), or by breaking a tie (and leading her preferred
alternative to be selected). Since a tie is associated with a 50 − 50 chance of either
alternative being selected, the expected benefit from voting when pivotal is V/2.
19bxc denotes the greatest integer k such that k ≤ x.
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Whenever c > V/2, costs outweigh the maximal possible benefit of voting and the
unique symmetric equilibrium has no agent participating.
Whenever c ≤ Ppiv(n− 1) ∗ V/2, the benefits of voting outweigh the costs even when
all other agents participate for sure. In that case, the unique symmetric equilibrium
would entail full participation.
For intermediate costs, symmetric equilibria involve agents mixing between voting and
abstaining. Indifference between the two implies that the value of voting precisely equals
its cost c. The more likely are others to vote, the higher are the incentives to free-ride
and abstain. The following proposition characterizes the unique symmetric equilibrium
in our setting:
Proposition 1 (No Polls – Equilibrium Participation)
For participation costs c ∈ (Ppiv(n− 1) ∗ V/2, V/2), in the unique symmetric Bayesian
Nash equilibrium, all agents participate with probability γ∗(n, p, c) ∈ (0, 1) given by:
V
2
∗
n−1∑
k=0
(
n− 1
k
)
(γ∗(n, p, c))k (1− γ∗(n, p, c))n−1−k Ppiv(k) = c
and all those participating vote sincerely for their preferred alternative. Furthermore,
γ∗(n, p, c) is decreasing in c.
In our experiments, V = $2, we consider n = 9, p = 2/3, and participation costs that
are c = 25 or c = 50 cents. The left panel of Table 2 contains the resulting equilibrium
voting probabilities. In addition, Table 2 reports the resulting expected participation
costs (for the group) and the resulting expected collective welfare, calculated as the
difference between the overall expected rewards for individuals and the costs incurred by
the group.
3.2 Introducing Polls
We consider polls that reveal to the electorate the underlying distribution of preferences,
i.e., all individuals know precisely which state R or B prevails (Perfect Polls treatment).
As before, when costs are sufficiently low, all agents participate, while when costs are
high enough, no agents participate. For intermediate costs, at least some of the agents,
depending on their preferences, will participate with some probability.
Suppose, for instance, that the realized state is B. Focusing on intermediate costs,
we consider quasi-symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibria. These are equilibria in which all
agents who share a preferred alternative (red or blue) use the same strategy. Since blue is
the a-priori majority preference, the pivotality conditions now need to be spelled out for
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each ‘type’ of individual, one who prefers red or one who prefers blue, separately. In order
for the text of this paper to remain focused, we do not spell out the pivotality conditions
that arise. The following proposition characterizes the unique quasi-symmetric equilib-
rium (in which all individuals who prefer the same alternative use the same strategy),
assuming the realized state is B.
Vote%
Prob
Expected%
Costs
Expected%
Welfare
Vote%Prob%if%
Majority
Vote%Prob%if%
Minority
Expected%
Costs
Expected%
Welfare %
Cost%=%25 0.61 137 1071 0.70 1 180 1012 %
Cost%=%50 0.21 95 995 0.19 0.39 117 899 %
Table&2:&Theoretical&Predictions.
No&Polls Perfect&Polls
Table 2: Theoretical Predictions
Proposition 2 (Perfect Polls – Equilibrium Participation)
For participation costs c ∈ (Ppiv(n− 1) ∗ V/2, V/2), in the unique quasi-symmetric Bayesian
Nash equilibrium, the participation probabilities for those preferring B and R are given by
γ∗B = γ
∗(n, c, 1
2
)/(2p) and γ∗R = γ
∗(n, c, 1
2
)/(2(1− p)) when c ≥ ccrit(p), while (1− p)/p <
γ∗B ≤ 1 and γ∗R = 1 when c < ccrit(p), where
ccrit(p) =
n−1∑
l=0
(
n− 1
l
)(
l
bl/2c
)
(1− p)l(2p− 1)n−l−1.
A few notes are in order. First, if all agents vote with some probability, notice
that the majority voters, those who prefer blue, should vote with lower probability than
the minority voters. Indeed, for all agents the cost of participation is given by c. In
equilibrium, all agents must equate the value of participating with its cost. Since the
size of the majority is, by definition, greater than that of the minority, it must be that
minority voters participate with greater propensities.20
This has a stark impact on outcomes. Indeed, since all voters, both in the majority
and in the minority, equate the marginal benefits of voting with the same cost c, elections
are likely to be ‘toss-up’ elections, in which alternatives are equally likely to be selected.
In terms of welfare, information induces minority voters to participate excessively. This
has two negative effects. First, participation costs are disbursed. Second, the alternative
preferred by the majority is less likely to be selected. In other words, welfare decreases
when more information is dispelled in the population.21
20When costs are sufficiently low, the incentives to vote increase, and minority voters ultimately vote
with certainty. This is the case corresponding to c ≤ ccrit(p). Note that Goeree and Großer (2007) cover
only the case c ≥ ccrit(p).
21All of these qualitative results would follow through if participation costs were randomly determined,
as long as the distributions from which costs were drawn did not depend on the alternative preferred by
an agent.
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The resulting unique quasi-symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium probabilities for
participation for majority and minority voters (say, for b- and r-individuals when B is
the underlying state) are reported in the right panel of Table 2. We also report the
resulting expected collective costs and expected welfare for the group.
3.3 Lab Polls
Our Lab Polls treatment does not mimic any theoretical environment that we are aware
of. Unlike most theoretical models studying polls (see, e.g., Coughlan, 2000 or Goeree and
Großer, 2007), in this treatment we do not restrict subjects to comply with the behavior
announced at the polling stage. We avoid such restrictions in order to emulate ‘real-world’
polling instruments. In fact, one of our goals is to inspect subjects’ (unconstrained)
reports in the polling stage. This creates a relatively complicated environment, in which
voters may choose to be either truthful or strategic in the polling stage of the game. In
addition, they can consequently decide to follow their intentions or adjust their behavior
after poll results are revealed.22
Certainly, this environment admits a babbling equilibrium, in which agents do not
condition their reports at the polling stage on their preferences and follow the equilibrium
of the No Polls treatment at the voting stage.
Other than this equilibrium, a natural class of equilibria to consider is that in which
agents do not mix at the polling stage (but potentially mix at the voting stage). If we
impose symmetry (so that b- and r-individuals behave in a symmetric fashion – reporting
either abstention, the alternative they prefer, or the alternative they do not support in
the polling stage), the analysis simplifies substantially. Indeed, all agents abstaining
constitutes part of a babbling equilibrium. Otherwise, without loss of generality, assume
that agents report truthfully their preferences at the polling stage.23 In that case, polls
reveal the realized distribution of preferences. The voting stage is then tantamount to a
Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983) setting. In particular, behavior at the voting stage must
coincide with an equilibrium of the corresponding Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983) game. In
our setting, we use numerical calculations to show that truthful reporting in the polling
stage is never part of an equilibrium.24 In other words, the babbling equilibrium is the
only equilibrium that does not involve mixing at the polling stage.
22Notice that this game involves, in principle, rather intricate considerations. Reactions to polls may
depend on the precise distribution of reports for both alternatives and for abstention. In that sense, an
agent may always be effectively pivotal in the polling stage, her reports may always affect the distribution
of ultimate outcomes.
23If all agents mis-report their preferences at the polling stage, the same information is transmitted
in the group up to a re-labelling of the alternatives.
24We calculated the equilibria corresponding to all distributions of preferences in our setting in the
induced (second-stage) voting games. For certain distributions, there are multiple equilibria. Therefore,
we considered all selections (mappings from realized distributions to a particular equilibrium in the
induced game at the voting stage) and reactions to polls containing an abstention. We then calculated
the incentives to deviate from reporting truthfully at the polling stage and following the corresponding
equilibria prescriptions at the voting stage.
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Intuitively, when the realized distribution is known, the greater the number of sup-
porters of one alternative, the lower the probability of participation by supporters of that
alternative. Therefore, lying at the polling stage serves to lower participation rates by
the supporters of the alternative the subject prefers less and can therefore be beneficial.
The analysis of the entire set of equilibria that allow for mixing at the polling stage is
beyond the scope of this paper.25 Nonetheless, we return to some indicators of the extent
to which subjects are best responding in our data when we discuss the results from the
Lab Polls treatment.
4 Results: Voting Behavior
In this section, we present the voting patterns observed in our data. We first describe the
overall voting propensities of majorities and minorities across sessions. We then consider
information and consequent beliefs as channels explaining voting behavior.
4.1 Turnout
Table 3 contains the observed voting propensities as a function of whether an individual
is part of the expected minority or majority, when such indication exists (all standard
errors appearing in parentheses). The comparative statics with respect to costs hold
across conditions: higher costs generating lower participation. However, in both our
Perfect Polls and Lab Polls treatments, minorities participate less than majorities (dif-
ferences significant at any reasonable level). Furthermore, the availability of information
reduces the probability of minority participation and increases the probability of majority
participation.
No#Polls
Cost%=%25 0.55%(0.05) 0.63%(0.04) 0.38%(0.05) %0.58%(0.05) 0.40%(0.05)
Cost%=%50 0.43%(0.04) 0.52%(0.05) 0.27%(0.04) 0.50%(0.05) 0.31%(0.04)
*%Majority%and%minority%correspond%to%those%observed%in%the%lab%poll.
Observed########
Vote#Prob#if#
Minority*
Perfect#Polls Lab#Polls
Observed#########
Vote#Prob
Observed#########
Vote#Prob#if#
Majority
Observed########
Vote#Prob#if#
Minority
Observed#########
Vote#Prob#if#
Majority*
Table 3: Observed Participation Propensities
25The number of pure actions, even imposing symmetry, is vast. For any action choices at the polling
stage, we need to specify the participation decisions for any possible realization of poll reports.
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Excessive voting by members of the majority group is a well-known result that was
documented in several other studies, in which majority membership is transparent (see
Duffy and Tavits (2008), Groβer and Schram (2010), and Kartal (2012)). Even though
this result goes against the predictions of pivotal voter model, the previous literature
does not suggest the reason why we observe majorities voting more than minorities. Our
design allows us to investigate this phenomenon in depth since in addition to the voting
propensities we also elicit the beliefs that voters hold regarding the election outcomes.
Such data regarding beliefs is necessary to disentangle whether the excessive voting of
the majority group members can be explained by the systematic mistakes in their beliefs
or, on the contrary, beliefs are accurate and these voters fail to best-respond to the
information available to them.
4.2 Response to Information
In order to understand the mechanism generating the observed participation rates, sub-
jects’ reports regarding their beliefs are particularly useful. Since behavior across costs
appears very similar for all of our treatments, for simplicity, in the remains of the paper,
we present results aggregated across costs.26
In the No Polls treatment, agents’ participation rates do not differ significantly when
elections are predicted to be toss-up elections (i.e., alternatives are tied or their support
differs by one vote) or not close. However, when information is available in the Perfect
Polls and Lab Polls treatments, elections that are perceived to be close generate signifi-
cantly greater participation than others.27 At first blush, these results seem in line with
the pivotal voter model – agents participate at greater frequencies when they perceive
themselves as pivotal. They are consistent with the insights of some of the experimental
literature that inspects the pivotal voter model and considers different likelihoods of close
elections (see, e.g., Duffy and Tavits, 2008 and Levine and Palfrey, 2007).
Our design allows us to unfold the responses to different events corresponding to
elections that are not close – those in which the preferred alternative is predicted to win
with a landslide, and those in which the opposing candidate is predicted to win with
a large victory margin. Figure 1 depicts subjects’ voting propensities as a function of
their predictions regarding the lead of their preferred candidate (where light gray bars
correspond to the frequency of the different guess leads in our data).28
26All of the observations hold true when separating treatments by costs. These separate analyses are
available from the authors upon request.
27In the Perfect Polls treatment, participation rates were 0.59 and 0.49 when elections were perceived
to be close and not, respectively. The difference between the two rates is significant at the 10% level.
In the Lab Polls treatment, participation rates were 0.62 and 0.42 when elections were perceived to be
close and not, respectively, with differences between the two rates being significant at the 5% level. The
statistical significance is assessed using the Wilcoxon rank-sum test with one observation per subject
per category.
28In Figure 1, we report only events that occurred at least 10 times over all experimental elections.
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Figure 1: Voting Propensities as a Function of Beliefs
Figure 1 illustrates behavior that is not naturally aligned with the prescriptions of the
pivotal voter model. While voting propensities are lower when the opposing candidate
is predicted to exhibit a large margin of victory relative to those corresponding to close
elections, the propensities to vote when the preferred alternative is predicted to have a
landslide win do not appear to be very different than those observed when elections are
predicted to be close. This is echoed statistically. Across sessions, voting propensities
are significantly lower when the preferred candidate is predicted to have a substantial
loss (with the winning candidate having a lead of at least two votes) relative to the
propensities to vote when the election is predicted to be close.29 These differences are all
significant at the 1% level. However, across treatments, propensities are not significantly
29When the preferred candidate is predicted to lose with a substantial margin, voting propensities
are 0.29, 0.26, and 0.22 in the No Polls, Perfect Polls, and Lab Polls treatments, respectively. The
corresponding rates for elections that are predicted to be close are 0.46, 0.59, and 0.62, respectively.
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different (up to a 9% confidence level) between predicted close elections and elections in
which the preferred alternative is predicted to win with a landslide.30
These results are mirrored by the response to the polling information in our Lab
Polls treatment. When the poll suggested the preferred alternative would experience
a substantial loss, the voting propensity was 0.29. When the poll suggested a toss-up
election, the voting propensity was 0.60, different than the former rate at the 1% level,
but not significantly different than the rate of 0.49 observed when a landslide victory for
the preferred alternative was suggested by the polls.
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Figure 2: Beliefs Accuracies
One could naturally wonder whether reported beliefs are at all accurate. Indeed, if,
say, agents tended to report exaggerated beliefs regarding the likelihood of their preferred
candidate winning with a large margin, ultimate behavior could still approximate that
prescribed by the pivotal voter model. Figure 2 depicts the predicted lead as a function
of the realized lead of the preferred alternatives. As can be seen, the No Polls treatment
exhibits fairly poor accuracies of beliefs (with some advantage given to the preferred
alternative). This should be expected since subjects do not receive any information that is
indicative of the composition of their group.31 However, subjects are fairly accurate in the
30When the preferred candidate is predicted to win with a substantial margin, voting propensities are
0.52, 0.57, and 0.51 in the No Polls, Perfect Polls, and Lab Polls treatments, respectively.
31The fairly consistent predicted lead of one vote for the preferred alternative can be explained as
follows. Each subject’s posterior that the selected jar color matches their preference is 2/3. Therefore,
the probability that any other individual shares their preferences is given by 2/3 ∗ 2/3 + 1/3 ∗ 1/3 =
5/9. In particular, the expected number of individuals preferring the alternative the subject prefers is
1+5/9∗8 = 5.44, while the expeced number of subjects preferring the other alternative is 4/9∗8 = 3.55.
Recall that individual turnout rates were between 43% and 55% (depending on costs). These would
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Perfect Polls and Lab Polls treatments, at least for moderate leads (where the majority
of our data lays). When actual leads are extreme, subjects are more conservative in their
beliefs, but the linkage between beliefs and realized leads is symmetric across losses and
victories of the preferred alternatives. In particular, distortions in beliefs cannot reconcile
in and of themselves the pivotal voter model with the participation responses to beliefs
we observe.32
Last, we mention an alternative way by which to consider subjects’ responses to
information. Recall that we elicited subjects’ predictions regarding both the composition
of groups as well as their predictions regarding the realized lead of either alternative.
Suppose that reported predicted leads were expectations derived from some perceived
probabilities of participation by either type of voter. We can then deduce these perceived
probabilities and calculate the induced probability of being pivotal for each individual.
Response to information can then be seen through the propensity to vote as a function
of these induced probabilities of being pivotal. Such a calculation generates very similar
insights to the ones described above. While a high probability of pivotality is associated
with greater turnout than a slightly lower probability of pivotality, the association is in
no way monotonic globally. In fact, the highest turnout rates correspond to moderate
induced probabilities of being pivotal.33
4.3 Individual Regression Analysis
We use regression analysis to investigate individual behavior. While the previous section
illustrated the link between participation and beliefs, we are interested in the relative
effects of other factors. In particular, we want to inspect whether behavior in specific
groups evolved in different ways throughout the experiment.
For each treatment, we run a Probit regression predicting the dependence of participa-
tion decisions on various explanatory variables, clustering standard errors by individuals.
Table 4 contains our estimations.
We first note that there are no group-specific effects in any of the three treatments.34
Second, there are no time effects, suggesting that behavior in our experiments exhibited
very little learning.35
translate into an expected lead of approximately one vote for the preferred alternative.
32We stress that learning is not at the root of the belief patterns we observe. In particular, if we
restrict attention to the last 10 periods of each session, beliefs remain accurate.
33For instance, in the Lab Polls treatment, turnout is 25% when the induced probability of being
pivotal is between 0.95 and 1, while it is 56% when the induced probability of being pivotal is between
0.25 and 0.35.
34In all treatments, all dummy variables that indicate a particular group of subjects are not signifi-
cantly different from zero with p-values above 10%.
35This provides justification for the way we report our results throughout the paper, pooling observa-
tions from all periods of the experiment.
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The regression analysis provides us with another opportunity to closely examine sev-
eral predictions of the pivotal voter model. Among other things, this model suggests that
an individual is more likely to participate when the voting costs are low, the composition
lead of the preferred alternative is small, the lead of the majority group is small if the
voter is
Group&2 0.14 [0.13] (0.11 [0.09] 0.06 [0.09]
Group&3 (0.01 [0.11] (0.01 [0.08] 0.07 [0.11]
Group&4& 0.16 [0.10] (0.02 [0.11] 0.25 [0.11]
Group&5 0.07 [0.14 0.06 [0.09] 0.08 [0.12]
Group&6& 0.07 [0.13] 0.02 [0.10] 0.04 [0.11]
Group&7 (0.02 [0.05] (0.03 [0.10] 0.19 [0.11]
Group&8 (0.06 [0.06]
Period (0.01 [0.01] 0.004 [0.01] (0.006 [0.01]
High&Cost&of&Voting (0.22 *** [0.05] (0.13 *** [0.03] (0.08 *** [0.03]
Cumulative&profit&at&t?1 (0.0001 [0.0001] (0.00004 [0.00008] 0.00006 [0.0001]
Profit&at&t?1 (0.001 *** [0.0002] (0.001 [0.0002] (0.0001 [0.0002]
Voted&at&t?1 (0.02 [0.07] (0.04 [0.07] 0.06 [0.07]
Voted&and&Won&at&t?1 0.38 *** [0.05] 0.40 *** [0.07] 0.23 *** [0.09]
Composition&lead&of&the&preferred&alternative&(belief) 0.006 [0.01] (0.04 *** [0.01] (0.03 ** [0.01]
Lead&of&the&majority&if&in&majority&(belief) 0.02 [0.02] 0.06 *** [0.01] 0.03 ** [0.01]
Lead&of&the&majority&if&in&minority&(belief) (0.14 *** [0.03] (0.15 *** [0.02] (0.14 *** [0.03]
Lead&of&the&preferred&candidate&(poll) (0.005 [0.01]
predicted&Probability&to&Vote&(mean) 0.48 0.46 0.46
#&of&obs. 879 1174 1024
Pseudo&R?squared 0.1663 0.1984 0.1493
Robust6standard6errors6are6reported6in6brackets6(standard6errors6were6clustered6by6individuals).
Group616is6the6baseline6in6all6treatments.6All6regressions6pertain6to6period626and6on6to6allow6for6lagged6variables.
For6dummy6variables6(Group6dummies,6High6Cost6of6Voting,6Voted6at6t(1,6and6Voted6and6won6at6t(1)6we6report6dF/dx6for6the6discrete
change6from606to61.
We6exclude6subjects6that6either6always6participated6or6never6participated6throughout6the6experiment,6and6those6whose6guesses6
about6the6composition6of6the6group6and6the6expected6number6of6votes6were6inconsistent.
***6(6significant6at61%6level,6**6(6significant6at65%6level,6*6(6significant6at610%6level
Perfect&PollsNo&Polls Lab&Polls
Probit&Regression:&Probability&to&Vote&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&&
(marginal6effects6reported6below)
Table 4: Probit Regressions Explaining Turnout (Marginal Effects Reported)
a member of the majority group, or when the lead of the majority group is small when
the voter is a member of the minority group. Indeed, the latter three types of events
correspond to a greater probability that an individual vote would be pivotal in the elec-
tion. Our data suggests that most but not all of these predictions hold true. In all three
treatments, higher voting costs decrease the probability to participate and a greater lead
of the alternative preferred by the majority decreases the probability of the minority
members to participate. Moreover, in both treatments with polls, the propensity to vote
declines with the composition lead of the preferred alternative. However, as illustrated
in the previous section and contrary to the predictions of the pivotal voter model, in
both poll treatments the lead of the majority group has a positive and significant effect on
participation by majority group members.
Finally, in all treatments subjects are more likely to vote in the current election if
they did so in the previous election and their preferred alternative won. This effect is
reminiscent of reinforcement learning models, according to which people are more likely to
18
choose strategies that achieved good results in the past rounds of the play (see Fudenberg
and Levine, 1998 and references therein).
4.4 Alternative Models
Before moving on to the discussion of the aggregate results and behavior of our subjects
in the Lab Polls treatment, we discuss in this section alternative models that may account
for the voting behavior reported above.
Risk Aversion and Loss Aversion
The pivotal voter model combined with risk or loss aversion cannot explain the be-
havior observed in our experiments. Indeed, suppose p−1 and p0 denote the perceived
probability that, absent one’s vote, the preferred alternative loses by one vote and ties
with the other alternative, respectively and let u denote agents’ utility function. Then,
the difference in utility terms between voting and not voting is given by:
1
2
(p−1 + p0)u(V ) + u(−c)
where, recall, V is the value of getting the preferred alternative selected and c is the cost
of voting and we normalize the utility of getting the less preferred alternative getting
selected to be 0. Both risk aversion, or concavity of the function u, or loss aversion,
which would diminish the absolute magnitude of u(V )/u(−c), would then mute the value
of voting. However, both would still suggest declining propensities to vote as the lead
becomes very large, which we do not observe in the data. Results reported in Figure
1 and Table 4 indicate that propensities to vote are statistically indistinguishable with
high leads from those of very close leads, which is incompatible with either loss or risk
aversion.
Regret
There are several theories that incorporate regret motives into the calculus of voting.
The original models of this sort, as in Ferejohn and Fiorina (1974), suggested that voters
calculate the loss associated with various outcomes without estimating the probabilities
of these outcomes and choose the option that minimizes regret. Such a model would
predict the curves depicted in Figure 1 to be flat, which is not what we observe.
The more recent theoretical models of regret such as Loomes and Sugden (1982) and
Sugden (1993) incorporate the idea that a decision-maker might feel regret for making a
wrong choice, ex-post, after the state of the world is revealed to her. Applying this idea
to political behavior, one may conjecture that voters may feel regret for having voted
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for the wrong candidate.36 However, notice that in our setup subjects know precisely
which candidate delivers higher utility for them. Therefore, the only two possible types
of regret that voters may experience in our setting are (1) the regret from voting when
one could have abstained and (2) the regret from abstaining when one could have voted
and changed the outcome of the election. Both types of regret may affect participation
rates, but still imply that greater convictions in either loss or victory should correspond
to lower voting propensities, which is not what we observe in our data.
Ethical Voting
Some recent work (see Feddersen, Gailmard, and Sandroni, 2009) has suggested that
an important mechanism affecting individuals’ participation decision is their perception
of what is “moral.” In those models, individuals get a utility benefit by taking an action
that promotes overall welfare. In our setting, welfare is tied to the number of individuals
preferring each alternative – the alternative having a majority support can naturally be
interpreted as the “moral” alternative and such a form of ethical voting would imply
participation rates that are higher for larger majorities, and potentially go against one’s
own preference (when the predicted majority preferred alternative is not one’s own).
However, this is not what we observe in our data in any of the three informational
treatments. Indeed, the perceived composition of voters (how many are expected to
be supporting either alternative) that we elicited is a good proxy for which alternative
is more ‘ethical.’ Nonetheless, when controlling for the predicted lead one’s preferred
alternative is expected to have, the perceived composition of voters does little to explain
turnout.37
Voting with the Winner
The increase in the propensity to vote associated with subjects’ prediction of their
preferred alternative’s advantage is consistent with a model in which subjects respond
not only to the probability of being pivotal but also have a desire to vote for the winner.
There is a growing empirical literature that documents such a desire using field data from
national elections. Herron (1998) analyzes micro-level data from the 1992 United States
presidential election and finds that Clinton supporters who believed that Clinton was
likely to win voted at higher rates than those who believed otherwise, while Bush sup-
porters were significantly less likely to turn out if they held the same belief. Similarly, in
the 2000 presidential election, a survey conducted under the American National Election
36See Ortoleva and Snowberg (2012) who incorporate regret motives into an incomplete information
model of voter turnout. In their setup voters support the candidate whose policy is more likely to be
better for them conditional on the state of the world and abstain if neither of the candidates is much
more likely to be better for them.
37For instance, in the Lab Polls treatment, conditional on the belief that the election will end up in
a landslide victory, voters that predict a small difference between the number of majority and minority
supporters vote with probability 44%, while those predicting a large difference between the number of
majority and minority supporters vote with a smaller probability of 34%. Similar behavior is observed
in other informational treatments.
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Studies revealed that of respondents who thought their preferred candidate would win by
a large margin, 65% still went out to vote (authors’ tabulation). In a similar spirit, the
Target Group Index Brasil study of 2003 interviewed 8, 907 individuals between the ages
of 20 and 64. Of those, 13% agreed with the statement “I always vote for the probable
winner in an election.”
There are several theoretical papers that incorporate a desire for voting for the winner
in a model of political behavior. The first such model is Hinich (1981) who considers
a theory of voting in two candidates elections. Hinich derives voting rules that depend
both on voters’ subjective beliefs about the election outcome and their preferences over
candidates. The main assumption is that voters’ utility increases if when voting for a
winner and decreases when voting for a loser. Hinich argues that this assumption is no
less plausible than the assumption that voters believe they can be pivotal.
More recently, two theoretical papers incorporate voters’ desire to vote for the winner
in the standard pivotal voter framework. Callander (2007) studies a sequential model of
voting and shows that a desire to conform might induce momentum and bandwagons on
the equilibrium path. In a companion paper, Callander (2008) investigates simultaneous
elections and establishes that a desire to win creates multiple equilibria, some of which
exhibit negative information aggregation – information aggregated in equilibrium helps
the worse candidate get elected.
Our experimental data provides an opportunity to estimate the magnitude of this ef-
fect. Consider a modified version of agents’ utilities from voting (borrowed from Callan-
der, 2007, 2008). If agent i votes for her preferred alternative, then her utility is given
by:
ui =
V
2
· Prob[preferred alternative wins] + a · Prob[voting for winner]− c
If agent i abstains, her utility is:
ui =
V
2
· Prob[preferred alternative wins]
Using this utility specification, we estimate the parameter a that maximizes the likelihood
of matching the voting pattern for each subject separately. That is, for each subject,
based on her 20 decisions, we find the parameter a that matches the largest number of
these decisions. Since there is generally a range of such maximizing parameters a, in what
follows we report the average value of a for each subject. Figure 3 plots the cumulative
distributions of estimated values of a by subject in each information treatment.
Figure 3 illustrates substantial heterogeneity in subjects’ voting behavior. Regardless
of the information treatment, there is a significant group of subjects who base their voting
decisions almost entirely on the probability of being pivotal (low values of a). At the
same time, voting behavior of other subjects is heavily influenced by the desire to vote
for the winner (high values of a).38
38A non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov test detects no statistical difference in the distribution of
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Figure 3: Cumulative Distributions of Estimated Values of a, by Treatment
5 Election Outcomes
In this section, we describe how the behavioral patterns of voting identified in the Sec-
tion 4 affect the aggregate election outcomes. We first discuss the distribution of votes
allocated to each candidate and, in particular, the prevalence of very close elections as a
function of the information available. We then consider the welfare consequences of the
electorate having access to information via polls.39
Recall, that the pivotal voter model predicts that information has overall negative
effect on the social welfare. This result is based on the observation that pivotality condi-
tion requires the majority voters to vote with lower probability than the minority voters.
This, in turn, results in an overall higher participation costs incurred by all voters, a
higher likelihood of observing a toss-up election and a lower chance of the majority-
preferred alternative to be selected. However, as we documented in Section 4, the voting
propensities of the majority group members is higher than that of the minority group
members, contrary to expected. Thus, the detrimental effects of information is no longer
a fact. In the remainder of this section, we will assess whether indeed a society is worse
off when voters have an access to polling data.
parameters a between the No Polls and Lab Polls treatments (p = 0.465), as well as between the Perfect
Polls and Lab Polls treatments (p = 0.461). There is, however, a difference between the No Polls and
Perfect Polls treatments (p = 0.031). Indeed, in the No Polls treatment we observe a significantly higher
percentage of subjects that have very low values of a < 10 (about 40%), while that percentage is only
20% in the Perfect Polls treatment.
39We note that there were no persistent biases toward the blue or red alternatives: behavior was not
significantly different across the labels of the alternatives.
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5.1 The Emergence of Toss-up Elections
Contrary to the prediction of the pivotal voter model, we find that toss-up elections (in
which alternatives either tied or differed by one vote) occurred significantly more frequently
in the No Polls treatment than in either of the two treatments in which information
regarding the distribution of preferences was revealed.40 In fact, the No Polls treatment
produces cumulative distributions that are first order stochastically dominated by those
generated by the other two treatments.41 Moreover, landslide elections appear more
frequently when information regarding preferences is available. Finally, we note that the
Perfect Polls and Lab Polls treatments generated very similar distributions of ultimate
vote leads that are not significantly different from one another.42
5.2 Welfare
We now turn to the performance of elections with and without polls in terms of overall
welfare and likelihood to select the majority-preferred alternative.
In terms of choosing the collectively optimal alternative, that favored by a majority,
polls appear to have a positive effect. As the top panel of Table 5 suggests, especially
for lower participation costs, the availability of Perfect or Lab polls assists somewhat in
achieving the alternative favored by the majority. These differences are more pronounced
when the group is closely divided (corresponding to type differences of 1 or 3). Participa-
tion costs are not significantly different across treatments as the second panel in Table 3
illustrates. In fact, in utility terms, group utilitarian welfare (accounting for payoffs from
the selected alternative and the participation costs), is not significantly different across
treatments.43
This result echoes results obtained in the previous studies (Klor and Winter (2006)
and Grosser and Schram (2010)) and contrasts some of the basic insights from the the-
oretical work on polls that suggests the negative effects of polls (due to the increased
propensity of the ‘wrong’ minority group to participate as we documented in Section 4).
40Statistically, we use a probit regression to explain whether an election culminated in a toss-up
outcome with dummy variables for treatments, while clustering observations by groups. For either cost,
when the Toss-up dummy is regressed on the Perfect Polls dummy (or Lab Polls dummy), leaving the No
Polls treatment as the baseline, we obtain a negative coefficient for the corresponding Polls dummy that
is significant at the 5% level. When the Toss-up dummy is regressed on the Lab Polls dummy leaving
the Perfect Polls treatment as the base group, we obtain a coefficient that is not significantly different
from zero.
41The graphs are omitted for brevity and available from the authors upon request.
42To compare the distributions of vote lead by the winner between Perfect Polls and Lab Polls we
used the same technique as for the comparison of the No Polls and Perfect Polls (Lab Polls) treatments
described above.
43Welfare is not significantly different across treatments according to any standard parametric or
non-parametric test clustering by groups.
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cost=25 cost=50 cost=25 cost=50 cost=25 cost=50
MajorityFavored*
NoPolls 70%[43] 69%[42] 96%[27] 96%[28] 80%[70] 80%[70]
PerfectPolls 85%[46] 76%[46] 97%[34] 97%[34] 90%[80] 85%[80]
LabPolls 88%[43] 82%[49] 100%[27] 90%[21] 93%[70] 84%[70]
OverallCosts**
NoPolls 128(6) 215(16) 117(6) 163(15) 123(4) 194(11)
PerfectPolls 119(6) 180(10) 130(7) 219(13) 124(4) 197(8)
LabPolls 120(7) 207(10) 118(8) 171(15) 119(5) 196(8)
NetWelfare**
NoPolls 869(31) 775(34) 1306(43) 1245(41) 1037(36) 963(38)
PerfectPolls 928(22) 841(31) 1311(38) 1210(37) 1091(29) 998(31)
LabPolls 978(26) 842(29) 1319(18) 1133(64) 1110(27) 929(32)
*Squareparenthesescontainthenumberofrelevantobservations.
**Roundparenthesescontainthecorrespondingstandarderrors.
CompositionofTypes
OverallTypeDifferenceof
1or3
TypeDifferenceof
5,7or9
Table 5: Aggregate Election Outcomes
We stress that had subjects used equilibrium strategies, with our volume of data, the
ranking of welfare across treatments would likely correspond to the theoretical predictions
and be statistically different.44
Though differences are not significant, we note that the welfare values observed do
follow the theoretical comparative statics with respect to costs, generating greater mean
observed welfare levels when participation costs are lower.
6 Poll Reports
Our Lab Polls treatment allows us to gain insight into how individuals respond to polls.
In principle, since we see that poll results affect behavior and outcomes, individuals could
potentially gain by misreporting their intended actions in the polling phase.
44For instance, for participation costs of 50, simulating our experiment assuming that subjects use
equilibrium strategies (with the number of subjects participating in our experiments) for 1, 000, 000 it-
erations leads to a likelihood exceeding 95% of group welfare without polls surpassing that with perfect
polls. Performing the same simulations using subjects’ experimental participation rates leads to a like-
lihood of less than 10% of group welfare without polls surpassing that with perfect polls. In particular,
this suggests that it is not the particular experimental realizations of preferences that are driving our
results.
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First, pre-election polls consistently overestimate voter turnout: while 82% of subjects
reported they will vote, less than 50% actually did vote. This result mirrors the trend
documented in the empirical literature that estimates turnout based on self reports in
the American National Election Study (see Holbrook and Krosnick, 2010 and references
therein).
On the individual level, of those reporting they will vote, 42% of subjects voted.
Nonetheless, subjects rarely voted for an alternative different than the one they declared
they would vote for: of the subjects intending to vote, only 6% cast a vote for an
alternative different than the one they chose in the poll.
In terms of incentives, individuals reporting a vote for their preferred candidate
earned, on average, $1.15 per election, individuals reporting a vote for their less preferred
candidate earned an average of $0.98, while individuals reporting abstention earned an
average of $1.13 (with standard errors of 3 cents, 10 cents, and 7 cents, respectively).
That is, experimental incentives were such that reporting the genuinely preferred can-
didate or intended abstention generated greater payoffs.45 This is interesting in view of
the theoretical predictions pertaining to the Lab Polls treatment. Indeed, subjects in our
experiments did not follow the babbling equilibrium. Furthermore, a substantial fraction
did not best respond at the polling stage. Nonetheless, a simple behavioral heuristic is
consistent with some of our data. Suppose each subject assumes that all others follow
their intended actions as declared in the poll. A subject would then vote only when
pivotal according to the poll. Given our experimental poll results, such behavior would
lead to a participation rate of 57%, which is fairly close to what we observed in the lab.
Overall, polls seemed to reflect the ultimate election outcomes. Of the elections that
did not end up in a tie, 84% of the outcomes coincided with those predicted by the polls.
In terms of outcomes, the literature on the effects of polls has identified two effects.
The Bandwagon Effect suggests that the predicted winner in a poll gains additional sup-
port after the poll’s publication. The Underdog Effect suggests that the predicted loser
gains additional support after the poll’s publication. Indeed, Bandwagon and Underdog
Effects have been extensively studied in the recent few decades starting with the pio-
neering work of Simon (1954), Fleitas (1971), and Gartner (1976), among others (see
Callander, 2007 and references therein for recent theoretical work on these phenomena).
While most work is in consensus regarding the existence of these two effects, the debate
about their magnitudes still goes on. Irwin and Van Holsteyn (2000) conduct a meta-
study of the empirical research on the two effects. The authors conclude that starting
from the 1980s, a Bandwagon Effect was more frequent than an Underdog Effect.
Figure 4 depicts the realized lead as a function of the lead predicted by the polls. As
can be seen, for moderate predicted leads, realized leads surpass those suggested by the
poll, thereby confirming to a Bandwagon Effect. Nonetheless, when predicted leads are
45Note that since subjects respond to the magnitude of the lead in the polls, individuals are ‘pivotal’
for any profile of others’ reports in the poll.
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extreme (greater than 3), realized leads are more conservative, supporting an Underdog
Effect. In other words, both effects gain support in our data, but which one prevails
depends on whether or not the poll ends up in a close or landslide outcome. Furthermore,
the magnitude of the effects depends on the precise poll outcomes. In particular, the
underdog effect appears more pronounced as poll leads become substantial.
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Figure 4: Bandwagon and Underdog Effects
One potential explanation for these observations is the following. Low poll leads are
more likely to arise when there are relatively many individuals reporting abstention at
the polling stage. In our data, 50% of those intending to abstain ultimately participated.
Since participation is more likely when one’s preferred alternative is leading in the polls,
those reporting abstention at the polls serve to magnify the lead observed at the polling
stage. Consequently, the difference between the actual lead and the poll lead of the winner
is expected to increase with the number of those abstaining at the polls, consistent with
the Bandwagon Effect we observe for low poll leads. For high poll leads, recall that 6%
of our subjects voted for an alternative different than the one they chose in the poll.
As it turns out, most of these subjects belonged to the minority group, and therefore
contributed to an exaggerated poll lead. When poll leads are high, fewer individuals
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abstain and this pattern of behavior has more impact. This generates the observed
Underdog Effect.
7 Conclusions
We provide an array of experiments that closely inspect voters’ turnout response to be-
liefs regarding ultimate outcomes and the consequent effects of information about the
electorate’s underlying preferences, specifically in the form of polls. The first message
that emerges from our analysis is that, contrary to the underlying premise of the pivotal
voter model, the propensity to vote increases with subjects’ predictions of their preferred
alternative’s advantage. This is the case despite our setting being, in many ways, con-
ducive for the strategic considerations posited by the pivotal voter model to play out: our
experimental groups are arguably small so that pivot probabilities are substantial and
many external motives that may be important in large political elections (peer pressure
to vote, changing knowledge about candidates, etc.) are controlled for. The monotonic
response to beliefs about one’s preferred alternative’s likelihood of winning leads to the
second message of the paper: pre-election polls do not exhibit the detrimental effects
on welfare that the extant theoretical work on the effects of polls predicts. In fact, pre-
election polls lead to more participation by the expected majority and generate more
landslide elections. Finally, our study provides insights on the behavior of individuals
in polls and the responses they generate. We find that individuals report participation
intentions that exceed the ultimate participation rates, but rarely misreport which can-
didate they would support if intending to vote. This feeds into the impact of polls on
outcomes. Close elections are more prone to Bandwagon Effects, by which poll winners
gain even greater leads in the actual election, while landslide elections are more prone to
Underdog Effects, where poll winners gain lower leads in the actual election.
The analysis suggests the usefulness of considering alternative theoretical constructs
to that suggested by the canonical pivotal voter model. For instance, incorporating a
desire to vote for winners, as suggested in Callander (2007), could generate predictions
in line with our results and help explain much of the individual data observed in our
experiments.
Last, our analysis raises questions regarding the value of polls. In our experiments,
when observing the ex-ante majority-preferred alternative (namely, the color of the re-
alized jar), the probability of that alternative being elected is 74% when no polls are
available, 91% when perfect polls are available, and 83% when endogenous polls are
utilized. This suggests the potential value of polls to well-informed candidates.
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